The treacherous alliance that brought war to Yemen

Among various Arab Spring countries, Yemen was hailed as an exemplar to a good transition. The world was impressed that the region’s no 1 country with the largest arms per capita has not succumbed into a civil war like Syria or Libya. Despite limited armed clashes here and there, the image was far positive than initial expectations of how an armed society may turn into. In Nov 2011 and after numerous cycles of negotiations, Yemen’s longest serving president Saleh officially handed power to his deputy Hadi in exchange for an immunity from legal prosecution for his time in office. This was known as the GCC initiative and it succeeded largely because Saudi Arabia was the main the broker of the deal –an oil-rich neighbor that enjoys tremendous leverage in Yemen. Unlike other turbulent countries like Libya and Syria, the international community has largely delegated Yemen’s issue to its Gulf partners. Hadi assumed his presidency officially after single-candidate nation-wide elections in Feb 2012 that served the purpose of a referendum. His period was set to 2-years in which a national dialogue would start, military would be reshuffled and prepare the country for post-transition period. Although security and economic performance initially improved, the transition period did not go as planned. The transitional government ( half of which came from Saleh's GPC Party)  led by veteran Basindwa faced many difficulties that rendered it ineffective. Meanwhile Houthis were advancing from their stronghold Saadah until they reached Amran- the gateway city to Sanaa.  Until this point, Saleh-Houthi alliance was not clear. A good number of people dismissed it as mere "conspiracy theory talk". Nevertheless, Saleh and Houthi leaders faced UN sanctions for stalling transition  but this move only infuriated Saleh and his allies- which in turn facilitated the coup against Hadi and his regime with Houthis entering and controlling the capital city Sanaa in Sep 21 2016 with full support and documented coordination with Saleh. 

Despite the fact it was on Sep 21^st that Houthis usurped power in Yemen by means of force, it was until few months later that full-scale war broke out. In March 2015, Houthis and Saleh decided to  get rid of Hadi after he escaped his house arrest and fled to Aden, the southern part of the country, taking it as his refuge and a temporary capital to restore his authority. It is widely believed that without the very existence of this treacherous Houthi-Saleh alliance, the coup against Hadi would have not been taken place and the whole war would not have materialized except for short-lived clashes here and there. However the reasons behind the dismissal reports about the existence of such alliance is rooted in the fact that Saleh and Houthis had fought against other fierce 6 wars between 2004-2010. The memories of these wars are still vivid- thousands of human casualties, displaced families, traumatized kids and shattered local agrarian economy. We can watch video records in Youtube of  Saleh attacking the Houthis and accusing them to have links with Iran and aiming to restore the Imam-led monarchy that pre-existed the republican regime in North Yemen. He repeatedly described them as thugs and vandals of public and private property in Sadah. In turn, the Houthis consistently called Saleh a corrupt tyrant and accused him of being a traitor serving Saudi. Israeli and US interests. Not surprisingly, the Houthis joined the 2011 peaceful protests, which demanded the fall of Saleh’s regime like other Arab Spring countries.

Only very hardcore realists who subscribe to the notion that “ there’s no such thing in politics as  permanent allies or permanent enemies" could anticipate such move. Nevertheless, it was a technically necessary alliance as both Saleh and Houthis needed each other. Sales is powerful however he is a signatory of the GCC initiative. He already handed power and any direct attempts to overthrow Hadi from his side would only jeopardize his immunity, assets and the future political career for his son and other close associates. That is why he was very delicate and secretive in his dealings with the Houthis. The Houthis on the other hand have displayed opposition to the outcomes of the national dialogue and were not happy with the GCC initiative in the first place, ironically accusing it for saving the "dictator" and stripping the "revolution" from its essence.  Given that Saleh cannot overtly lead a coup and Houthis being unable to highhandedly dethrone Hadi's regime without Saleh's resources and contacts, their alliance was politically inevitable despite all the odds.

 Despite being treacherous in nature instigating civil strife and war, Saleh and Houthi alliance is a good manifestation of prudent play of politics. In fact, without the Saudi-led coalition intervention, it would have been very capable of crushing its opponents and it would have taken effective control of the country marking a post-Hadi era. Some observers say that the Saudi-led air campaign has unintentionally strengthened  Saleh-Houthi alliances as both sides found a common enemy knowing that they can't survive without the full cooperation and coordination with each other. Also, if such campaign did not start in the first place, it is very possible that they will fight each other until one is able to eliminate the other and monopolized power. However we can only speculate on what could have happened if some events turned differently. But we can't deny the fact that Saleh and the Houthis formed a formidable alliance. In short, they complement each other as they fill what each lacks – ideology for Saleh and state experience for Houthis. Saleh is a master of politics and has ruled the country utilizing his "dancing over the snakes" tactics. His pragmatism allows him to be flexible and work with his former enemies as long as he gets out victorious and crush rivals who currently threaten his power. However Houthis fight a holy war. Just like alQaeda and ISIS, the Houthis consider their fighters to be martyors for God and Islam. They call their movement al-Miserah alQuraniyah ( The Quranic March) and they prefer to call themselves as Ansarallah ( Supporters of God ) rather than the Houthis as the later is associated with a family rather than a political and social project.  Also, Houthis know that they can't capture the Yemeni state without coordination with Saleh as his men dominate both the military and bureaucracy. Of course, both Saleh and Houthis know that sooner or later they will have to clash however until that time comes, they will manage to find other local and foreign allies.